Clausewitz 3

As the Russian aggression in Ukraine continues it is interesting to re-read Clausewitz again. In his major work on strategy in warfare we rediscover lots of strategies that Putin’s army applies in the war against Ukraine. But equally, the successful defence strategy of Ukraine with a sizable difference in the size of the army, they both let us better understand the theoretical considerations and relevance of Clausewitz until today. For example,the overriding importance of the size of an army in comparison to the opponent was discarded by Clausewitz (p.111-112) already. He refers to the battles at Rossbach and Leuthen in the Seven Years’ War 1756-1763. Frederic the Great won 2 battles despite having armies of half the size or even less at his disposal (Tempelhoff). Training and morale of the armies is an important part of the explanation of a later outcome. In terms of strategy Clausewitz mentions surprise and wit in chapters as well. The next 3 chapters are devoted to (in modern words) distribution and mobility of forces in space and across time including additionally a strategic reserve. The “classical warfare” which Clausewitz transforms into a theory of warfare is followed with horrific resemblance by Putin’s Russia in the 21st century. “War is an instrument of politics” writes Clausewitz 200 years ago (p. 467-8).
The painters or theorists that attempted to go beyond this rationale have had a hard time to convince politicians otherwise. The idea that law and courts will replace the atrocious power play of nations is silenced again for some years, only to come back with more force eventually.
(Image Extract from Nationalgalerie and Digital Collection of Gemäldegalerie 2024-1 by Adolphe Menzel “Ansprache Friedrich des Großen an seine Generale vor der Schlacht bei Leuthen 1757) unvollendet.