Russian Angst

The title of a book “Russian Angst” by Thomas Franke summarizes the state of Russian society under Putin. It dates back to 2017, but the underlying process of Angst in the Russian society is increasing rather than diminishing due to the already 2 years long intensive hot war of Russia against Ukraine. The Russian Angst is a fear of a continued roll back of its authoritarian rule in Eastern parts of the world and its internal threat that its own people will claim more rights like freedom of speech, freedom of the press and effective democratic voting rights. In a dictatorship the “Angst” is a pervasive phenomenon which creeps into all spheres of live. Franke and Dornblüth (2023) describe the toxic society in Russia. Intoxication and torture of opponents are used by the Putin regime as a threat to suppress critical voices in Russia. Through this a climate of “Angst” is spread so that any internal opposition has to face very high risks to utter any discontent. The experience of a barbarian, totalitarian regime is well known. The threat to life and the presence of intimidation to any disobedient behaviour are strictly persecuted. Nevertheless, the need to think beyond the Putin regime is well under way. The more external and internal, real or imagined threats are countered with brutal force, the more the regime reveals its true kind of governance by force. This invites and leads to the strengthening of counter forces both internally and externally. It seems like box fight in the before last round of a very vulnerable, weakened and isolated boxer. Not many will bet on the likely loser and more countries who previously supported Putin will stop their erroneous policy. Russian Angst and loneliness will further increase.

Satellites

Every now and again satellites make headlines. In international politics the “Sputnik moment” of 1957 was such a key defining moment. Russia sending a satellite into space set off a massive investment programme in the United States to counter a potential threat from Russia coming from space. In 2024 we discuss again the next ratcheting up of in a race of armament threatening the earth from space. Russia is believed to enable satellites to carry a nuclear bomb that would orbit around the earth and could lead to mass destruction of satellites that nowadays enable navigation, communication and monitoring what is happening on earth.
As beyond the state-owned satellite networks there has been a private satellite network that assisted Ukraine to defend itself against the Russian aggression, we probably are about to witness the extension of warfare on earth into space. In addition to the so-called cyberwar, which threatens computer-based systems with viruses, ransomware or break-downs, we may face new kinds of threats. We shall have to consider this as part of modern warfare.
Since the late 1960s there exists an international agreement not to use space for nuclear arms. However, Russia does no longer seem to respect its commitment to this. A further escalation of the war of Russia in Ukraine with “conventional” weapons carries the risk to set off another arms race including the earths orbit. This is no science-fiction or whistle blowing, but based on a high-level report and press coverage by the New York Times on 2024-2-17 (Link).
The outrageous implication of such a massive explosion in space is that its implications of the globe on parts of the world and people not being a party in the war will suffer most likely as much as the opposed nations. The food shortages due to Russia’s aggression caused people in Africa to suffer or even die of hunger. Satellite outages of a massive scale will have severe consequences as well.
Information and communication systems have proven to be determining the outcome of a war. This has been one lesson of more than two hundred years of studying military strategies since Clausewitz. Space and satellites have apparently not contributed to improve the understanding of each other, but only the communication within the respective communication bubbles. Maybe artists can help us to overcome the danger of escalation. (Image: “Afrogalactica” by Kapwani Kiwanga 2011: calogue of exhibition “The length of the horizon” Wolfsburg and Copenhagen 2023).

Peaceful aggression

It is the merit of youth to try out and get away with new things. The peace movements of the 60s and 70s have had their origin in peaceful actions or sit-ins that managed to raise awareness of aggressive foreign policies of the U.S. and allies. The aim of peaceful meeting was to have an impact on government policies by not being aggressive towards anybody. The political force stems from the power of peaceful persuasion by not forcing persons of other opinions. We are many and we think differently.
The climate activists of 2023 have chosen a different route before abolishing their so-called peaceful activism. This form of protest consists in reaching media attention by blocking road circulation at critical intersections. It turned out to be perceived as an aggression for many persons much unlike the peaceful actions from decades before, which were also sit-ins, but in areas with no or little traffic.
Similar to the distinction in freedom from violence versus freedom to do something. The notion of aggression has 2 orientations. Not being aggressive towards somebody or something could be understood as peaceful aggression if the activity or non-activity has an effect on other persons as if they suffered a form of aggression. In the eyes of the spectator the peaceful road blocks may have a violent impact. Reactions might follow accordingly in a spiral of violence rather than the proclaimed peaceful impact. There is, therefore, a fundamental difference between the peaceful peace movements and the “peaceful aggression” of many of the climate activists blocking roads. Rather than spreading peace, the outcome is a rather violent reaction against perceived unacceptable hindrance to do something.
To meet in a church in the presence of priests (2023-9-23, 12 apostles in Berlin-Tiergarten) does not change the thrust of the campaign, which I coin as peaceful aggression. Therein lies the eventual failure to reach more popular support for the cause and the action of the self-proclaimed “last generation”. In ratcheting up the spiral of aggression, the movement contributed to the rising frustration of persons with no or only very difficult alternatives to their means of transportation. Aggressive opponents of the movement received undue media attention and, probably, hardened the opposition to the climate cause.
In analogy to cold versus hot war, we have entered a period with peaceful aggression versus aggressive aggression. Difficult times for peaceful peace movements.

Clausewitz 3

As the Russian aggression in Ukraine continues it is interesting to re-read Clausewitz again. In his major work on strategy in warfare we rediscover lots of strategies that Putin’s army applies in the war against Ukraine. But equally, the successful defence strategy of Ukraine with a sizable difference in the size of the army, they both let us better understand the theoretical considerations and relevance of Clausewitz until today. For example,the overriding importance of the size of an army in comparison to the opponent was discarded by Clausewitz (p.111-112) already. He refers to the battles at Rossbach and Leuthen in the Seven Years’ War 1756-1763. Frederic the Great won 2 battles despite having armies of half the size or even less at his disposal (Tempelhoff). Training and morale of the armies is an important part of the explanation of a later outcome. In terms of strategy Clausewitz mentions surprise and wit in chapters as well. The next 3 chapters are devoted to (in modern words) distribution and mobility of forces in space and across time including additionally a strategic reserve. The “classical warfare” which Clausewitz transforms into a theory of warfare is followed with horrific resemblance by Putin’s Russia in the 21st century. “War is an instrument of politics” writes Clausewitz 200 years ago (p. 467-8).
The painters or theorists that attempted to go beyond this rationale have had a hard time to convince politicians otherwise. The idea that law and courts will replace the atrocious power play of nations is silenced again for some years, only to come back with more force eventually.
(Image Extract from Nationalgalerie and Digital Collection of Gemäldegalerie 2024-1 by Adolphe Menzel “Ansprache Friedrich des Großen an seine Generale vor der Schlacht bei Leuthen 1757) unvollendet.

Finding Peace

In international conflicts it the task of diplomacy to find or negotiate peace agreements. Monitoring of the evolution and progress is part of the deal. For societies internally it is equally important to find peace again. Totalitarian regimes are characterized by terror and intimidation of its own citizens. This holds true today as much as in the past. Finding peace, however, necessitates to prosecute criminals and this irrespective of their previous or current status in society. The American authorities after the 2nd world war have held more than ten thousand prisoners due to their commanding functions in the NS-time. After 3 years of imprisonment and attempts of so-called re-education the evaluation of the results were of very modest success. Most prisoners would find excuses rather than admit to their participation in the killing machine of the Nazi throughout Europe and over more than a decade.

The study by Christa Horn (1992) “Die Internierungs- und Arbeitslager in Bayern 1945-1952” comes to the same sobering conclusion (p. 127 extract below). This bears the danger that the totalitarian ideology continues to have supporters and even the transmission to other generations might be attempted. This highlights the importance of reconciliation in the lengthy process of finding peace. It far from easy to resolve who is guilty and of what. The Americans started the process before handing over responsibility to the regional judicial system. More than 75 years after 1945 we still have to name and insist on the criminal behavior of the totalitarian regime with millions of party officials and even more followers. Finding peace is a protracted process if not a struggle that involves 3 and maybe 4 generations by now.

Winning Peace

Most analysts of international conflicts deal with winning or losing a war. At best they deal with short-term versus long-term versions of winning and losing. However, the question of how to win or achieve a lasting peace is rarely researched. Research on the 2nd World War reveal as soon as the turning point of the war was achieved the preparation of what will come after defeat. Organising humanitarian relief is part of warfare. The U.S. has set a good example of how to organise humanitarian aid as well as ensuring a lasting peace in Europe after the 2nd World War. Lots of books have been written on the Marshall Plan to get the economies in Europe (Western Europe) back to producing. Much less attention has been devoted to the important element of “de-nazification” of whole societies.
To win peace after the monstruous crimes of the Nazi-regime and the millions of followers and ruthless fighters was a challenge without precedents. The U.S. gave a good example of how to handle the process of winning peace in the regions under its military authority. In the following I shall refer to work published by Christa Horn (1992) “Die Internierungs- und Arbeitslager in Bayern 1945-1952”. The Allies had agreed upon to pursue war criminals. In April 1944 the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces published the “Handbook for Military Government in Germany”. It was deemed important to detain “certain government and party officials and members of police and para-military formations” (p.17).
Common to demilitarisation efforts after a war, it is the primordial function to reduce the risks of a renewed uptake of guerilla-like attacks due to the amount of arms still widely available or hidden on the enemy’s territory. The document specified further that the continued presence of Nazis in government and other exposed positions “might be a threat to the security of the Allied Forces or an impediment  to the attainment of the objectives of Military Government in Germany” (Arrest Categories Handbook, P.2). Denazification was a means to an end. The size of the task was, however, underestimated at several instances. For example, the organisation of the arrest and detention of more than 100.000 persons was a difficult task. After the end of fighting the transition to peace is not instantaneous. Hierarchical military and party structures had to be dismantled. The so-called “automatic arrest” issued on 13.4.1945 included all grades from the NSDAP down to the “Kreisleiter” or even “Ortgruppenleiter” as well as SS members and their “Helferinnen” (Horn, 1992 p.21). These arrests without judicial procedures came under critic as not-American in the U.S., but it took until 10.10.1948 to abandon this procedure. The literature on the issue refers more to the lack of adequate judicial procedures to handle such so many legal procedures with qualified persons as well as the difficulty to organise detention camps for more than a hundred thousand persons that should deserve to be prosecuted. Handing over to the national or regional judicial instances was, therefore, an important step. The risk to abandon the process of “denazification” was evident, but it was equally important to counter the expansion of the Russian-domination in Eastern Europe with the help of a strengthened Western Europe. Winning peace is a delicate balance of prosecution through the winners of the war and the subsequent prosecution of criminal actions through the indigenous population and its new institutional and judicial setup.
Social Sciences have a lot of solid insights to offer to win peace. With careful consideration they are helpful to learn from even for current international affairs and raging wars. Demilitarisation is only a small part of winning peace. Changing mind sets to internalise humanitarian values remains the biggest challenge and involves more than one generation.

Nations Fail

Ever since Adam Smith wrote on the “Wealth of Nations” the topic concerns social scientists. The discourse around the wealth of nations has become even more fundamental these days. Beyond wealth calculated in economic terms we are convinced to add well-being of the population as well as the state of the environment into the accounting procedures like national accounts. But wait a second. Similar to the term wealth we have to widen our perspective in what is considered to be a nation. Shifting borders through wars (Russia aggression on Ukraine) or separatist tendencies of regions, (re-)unification of Germany or Korea (eventually) show that the nation is a concept in flux. Considering migrants from former colonies still as having residential rights in the colonising country shows, there is more to nations than a one size fits all nation concept.
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson had published the book on “Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity and poverty” already in 2012. On the 3rd of October Germany celebrates its re-unification only because the Russian dominated German Democratic Republic (and the other Eastern European satellite states under Russian control) can be considered as a failed state. These Russian dominated states crushed private initiatives and build corrupt systems where party allegiance and hierarchical structures were overemphasised. Following Acemoglu and Robinson (chapter 10) the lack of diffusion of prosperity is likely to be the root cause. Even similar to the French revolution, which brought about tough measures of redistribution, the external threats to the post-revolution France demanded subscription of masses into armies to defend the young republic against aristocratic rulers in the surroundings. If monarchy in France is a failed state, the post-revolution France survives due to high identification with the republican idea. The Soviet dominated Ukraine is a failed state, but the Ukraine of today resists due to its willingness to defend its own republican ideals. To get virtuous circles of development started, inclusiveness across the board is necessary. Leave nobody behind, seems to be a shortcut summary. It is much easier said than done. Loosing younger generations in the sense that they no longer subscribe or feel part of an inclusive wealth of the nation is a highly dangerous path. Failed states have a history in failed inclusive social and economic practices. Democracies are at risks just as much as authoritarian nations. However, democracies have better institutional settings to address the lack of inclusion and in multiple ways.
When I celebrate the 3rd of October in the Federal Republic of Germany I celebrate (1) the accomplished failure of the GDR, its undemocratically elected elites, corrupt institutions and the failure of the thousands of willing collaborators of the Russia-backed regime; (2) the peaceful resistance movement, (3) the relatively short-lived humanitarian focus of the Russian leadership at the time to not send in the tanks and (4) the willingness of the FRG to support 20 million new citizens for many years to come (5) the allies of the FRG to accept the potential security threat of a strengthened Federal Republic of Germany, which might entail a shift in the balance of power in Europe.
And yet, even in 2023 we pose questions on what is the concept of failure, when authoritarian regime can still survive for sooo long and some still accomplish extensions. We keep questioning the sense of the term “nation” in modern times and across the globe. Too many wars are still fought in the name of a “nation” even if only a handful of military-supported leaders and single autocrats try to impose wars in the name of some rather vague or plainly mistaken claim of nationhood.
On the 3rd of October we celebrate that “nations can fail” opening a path into a more prosperous and inclusive society. Some nations fail, just because they were no nation in the first place. The GDR was such an artefact of international compromise as part of the overall “balance of power” and the Cold War. The result of this process gives so much hope to other divided nations (Korea) or nations under authoritarian oppressive rule.

Peace and AI

Rather than asking AI to draft a peace treaty, I used AI to generate images to illustrate my blog entry on strategic thinking and peace deals. My own bias for impressionistic images in art have guided my choice previously. The alternative suggestions from AI based on BING reveals the progressive as well as stereotypical creation of images through algorithms. Same gender in all images, even if the women only image is rather progressive, but as a matter of fact women still tend to be involved less in warfare. The racial stereotypes of AI in image creation also needs attention as the 2 POC persons are depicted in an unfavorable way, not one of strength as for the caucasian stereotype. Living with AI is a joint learning process, likely to be a long one, too. Critical assessment of output remains a human task and we need to train people how to critically and carefully analyze the flood of images in addition to photos.

Thucydides on War

Thucydides (born around -460) has received a lot of fame for his “thick description” of the Peloponnesian War. He deserves continued praise even for inspiring statisticians. The account of events without emotions, but with lots of details, is often perceived as the beginning of historiography and history as science as well as empirical political science. The entry of “Thucydides” in the Encyclopedia of Social Measurement (2005, p.805) by P.A. Furia and A. Kohen cites the derivation of a causal or explanatory effect based on his historical account as a foundation of scientific approaches based on empirical data. “The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon (i.e. Sparta), made war inevitable” (Thucydides, I 23). The empirical assessment of the growth of power is subject to controversial accounts. Power may derive from population, wealth, industry, weapons, munition or general military capabilities or skills. The assessment would also need to consider relative rather than absolute strength of just a one-sided approach. Here we are in the middle of the Russian war on Ukraine from 24.2.2022 onwards. Statisticians discuss, whether it is just a single variable that has the overall explanatory power for the beginning of the war and what other intervening variables might be important to take into account to avoid a selection bias. Beyond this materialist explanation we might stress the importance of the sociological concept of “collective fear” (links to approximation through trust, xenophobia) of the strength of Athens as the underlying causation of the beginning of war. The ideation of perceived strength gives rise to the construction of many intervening processes (Coleman’s macro-micro-macro linkages), which make a simple causal attribution just to material strength an illusion or risky shortcut explanation. The Thucydidean Method (p.806) exemplifies much of the dilemma and spice of social science analyses. Scholars of diplomacy challenge the empiricist perspective in arguing that the breakdown of diplomatic discourse several decades before was at the beginning of the causal chain. Here again we can make links to the preparation of war by Russia through strategic diplomacy as well as the risks taken through a break-up of diplomatic channels of communication. The perceived strength of the opponent in war might play a decisive role at the beginning and at the end of war. The charisma of leaders, democratic decision-making and political alliances with neighbouring states, Sicily at the time of the Peloponnesian War, were further intervening processes. This is perhaps not all too different from today, if we consider the role of Belarus in the aggression of Russia against the Ukraine. In fact, Thucydides seemed to be convinced that under similar circumstances human behaviour would reproduce itself. Therefore, thick description of historical facts might still inform political leaders today and tomorrow.
(Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum, XV pp. 752,
Der neue Pauly, Enzyklopädie der Antike 12, pp.505 image below).

Fukushima

Ein Bericht über die Explosionen von 2 Blöcken des Kernkraftwerks Fukushima lassen uns Menschen ziemlich dumm aussehen. Wir glauben, alle möglichen katastrophalen Ereignisse vorhersehen zu können und werden doch wieder des besseren belehrt. In der Buchserie der Presses Universitaires de France (PUF) erschien in 2022 “Un récit de Fukushima” in dem der Direktor des Atomkraftwerkes vor der Untersuchungskommission berichtet, wie genau die verschiedenen Ereignisse Erdbeben und Tsunami mit der Verkettung von offensichtlichen menschlichen Fehlentscheidungen einhergingen. Planungsfehler, wie zu tief liegende Notstromaggregate, da rasch überflutet, sowie Kosteneinsparungen bei Vorsorge gegen als unrealistisch eingestufte Risiken (so starkes Erdbeben, Tsunami) haben die Katastrophe ermöglicht. Nach Tschernobyl haben wir nun Saporischschja fürchten gelernt. Das Atomkraftwerk Mykolajiw steht wohl als nächster Schrecken auf der Liste. Neben Planungsfehler, Kostensparen und menschlichem Versagen kommt nun die Gefahr von Nuklearkatastropen auf die Liste des Kriegsarsenals. Nicht als Bombe, wie wir bisher annahmen, sondern als nicht schützbare Infrastruktur, die kaum zu verstecken ist. Der nächste Tabubruch ist realistischer geworden. Die Kosten für Abwehrraketensysteme neben jedem Atomkraftwerk wohl etwas teuer und eventuell ineffizient. Wer befasst sich mit derartigen verbotenen Gedanken? Die Schrecken des 21.-ten Jahrhundert könnten sich als noch schlimmer gestalten als wir zu denken wagten. Atomkraft: die Geister, die ich rief, ich werd’ sie nicht mehr los.
Also eine dezentrale Energieversorgung durch Wind und Solar mit 100.000-den von kleinen Anlagen, in Gärten und auf Dächern erscheint als realisierbarer Lösungsansatz. Warum sagt das kaum eine/r? “Everyday for future” its easy. Mehr grüne Energie für Frieden = Greenpeace mal anders.